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Introduction
We consider an exchange economy with a nite number of agents. Each agent is initially endowed with a nite number of indivisible homogeneous or heterogeneous commodities and may consume as many items as he wishes. An agent's utility function is a set function over the set of all commodity bundles. This exchange economy is fairly broad. Some related examples of it include the exchange economy in Bikhchandani and Mamer 1 and Gul and Stacchetti 7 , the assignment problem Koopmans and Beckman 12 , Shapley and Shubik 20 and the auction model in Vickrey 21 . It is also analogous to the job-matching market in Kelso and Crawford 11 1 .
It is known that the assignment problem has a competitive equilibrium. 2 Indeed Shapley and Shubik 20 de ned a market game for the assignment problem and showed that the market game is totally balanced and thus has a nonempty core. It follows from the core equivalence theorem that a competitive equilibrium exists in the assignment problem. This existence result depends on the assumption that each buyer consumes at most one unit. If buyers can consume as many as they wish, then a competitive equilibrium may not exist; see Bikhchandani and Mamer 1 , Kelso and Crawford 11 and Section 3 for examples. This motivates a natural question: Under what circumstance does a competitive equilibrium exist under the general situation? Kelso and Crawford 11 studied a job-matching market and discovered that if rm's utility function satis es their gross substitutes condition, their matching model has a nonempty core and thus has a competitive equilibrium since a core matching is also competitive Kelso and Crawford 11, pp.1487 & 1502 . Bikhchandani and Mamer 1 used a di erent approach and obtained a necessary and su cient condition for the existence of competitive equilibrium. In their approach, they designed two linear programmings and showed that a competitive equilibrium exists if and only if the two linear programmings have solutions in common. Lately, Gul and Stacchetti 7 found two new su cient conditions, the no complementarities and the single improvement property, on buyer's utility function for the existence of competitive equilibrium. They showed that their two new conditions are equivalent to the gross substitutes condition in Kelso and Crawford 11 and then invoked the nonempty core theorem in Kelso and Crawford 11 to obtain their existence theorem. This paper uses the core approach in Shapley and Shubik 20 to study the same existence issue. We use the economy to generate a coalitional form game and want t o s h o w that the balancedness of the game provides a useful necessary and su cient condition for the existence. Typically the number of players in a coalitional form game generated by an economy is the same as the number 1 But it should be aware that a worker's utility function in Kelso and Crawford 11 is more complicated and it depends on not only the received salary but also the name of a rm with whom he is matched. This is quite di erent from the exchange economy of this paper in which agents are not concerned with the names of the owners of the commodities.
of agents in the economy. But we observe that when the coalitional form game is generated in this standard manner, its core does not coincide with the set of competitive p a yo s and the balancedness does not provide su cient information on the existence of competitive equilibrium for the original economy; as shown in Example 1. To resolve the problem, we provide an alternative w ay to generate a coalitional form game. The approach is as follows. Suppose that an economy has one agent i with no indivisible commodities and one agent j with two indivisible commodities, 1 and 2. Given such an economy, w e consider a bilateral exchange economy with four agents", i; j; 1 and 2, such that agents i and j have the same utility functions as they do in the original economy but both have n o indivisible commodities even though agent j owns two commodities in the original economy, and commodity agents" 1 and 2 have zero utility functions but own commodities 1 and 2 respectively. Then we use this bilateral exchange economy to generate a coalitional form game for the original exchange economy. It follows from the argument made in Kelso and Crawford 11, pp.1487 & 1502 that the core equivalence theorem holds for this bilateral exchange economy, i.e., the core of the coalitional form game coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payo s. Our observation is that a competitive equilibrium exists in the bilateral exchange economy if and only if it exists in the original exchange economy. Therefore a competitive equilibrium in the original economy exists if and only if the generated game on fi; j; 1; 2g is balanced, since the balancedness of the game is the necessary and su cient condition for it to have a nonempty core Bondareva 2 , Shapley 18 .
The above idea is in fact not completely new and it has been implicitly used in Kelso and Crawford 11 before. In their one-sided matching" market, they start with the coalitional form game and construct a job-matching market by adding dummy buyers, each with an identical utility function. Here we consider an exchange economy with heterogeneous utility functions and construct a bilateral exchange economy to generate a game by adding dummy commodity sellers. This approach is quite useful because it delivers information on existence or nonexistence of a competitive equilibrium at the same time. Moreover, we can say exactly what are the competitive prices in the original exchange economy. They are nothing but the core payo s of the coalitional form game received" by those commodity sellers". Our second concern is the incentive aspects of competitive price mechanisms. A mechanism is individually coalitionally strategy proof if it is always the best for each agent each agent i n each coalition to reveal his true information. It is well-known that the minimum competitive price mechanism in the auction model in Vickrey 21 exists and it is individually strategy proof. Demange 3 and Leonard 13 studied the assignment problem and independently showed that the minimum competitive price mechanism is individually strategy proof. Demange and Gale 6 studied a generalized assignment problem and showed that the minimum competitive price mechanism exists and it is individually strategy proof as well. The minimum competitive price mechanism is coalitionally strategy proof in these models if side payments are not allowed. These three models and their outcomes are bilateral in nature. One may w onder if this bilateral feature is the source of the nice incentive property of the minimum competitive price mechanism. We will show that this is not the case. Indeed we use a bilateral exchange economy and show that the minimum competitive price mechanism exists but it is not immune to the misrepresentation of the true information by individuals or coalitions. In fact we show that examples of exchange economies exist for which no competitive price mechanism is individually or coalitionally strategy proof. Therefore, our result reveals that it is the assumption of unit demand in the assignment problem and the Vickrey auction model that contributes to the strategy proof property of the minimum competitive price mechanism. 3 The intuition is as follows: An agent in the current model has the opportunity to misrepresent his utility function to undercut the commodity bundles in his demand correspondence. This type of misrepresentation decreases competition in the demand side and thus lowers the competitive prices for his consumption bundle. Since coalitional misrepresentation does not need any side payments in the current model, our result may also provide a new insight for the formation of bidder rings, a very fact in the auction practice which is often interpreted as a by-product of side payments or of repeated auctions. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 de nes the exchange economy. Section 3 proves the main result on the existence of competitive equilibrium. Section 4 studies the incentive properties of competitive price mechanisms.
The Exchange Economy
Let N = f1; 2; ; n g denote the set of agents. Each agent i 2 N is initially endowed with a nite number of indivisible commodities i = f! i1 ; ; ! ij ; ; ! ik i g, where k i 2 f 0; 1; 2; g is a nite integer. Thus some agents may not have initial physical endowments k i = 0 and some agents may have units of them k i 1. Let = i=n i=1 j=k i j=1 ! ij denote the set of all commodities in the economy and 2 denote the set of all commodity bundles. For an agent i 2 N, his utility function u i is a set function u i : 2 ! R satisfying u i ; = 0. Henceforth we assume that agents' utility functions are weakly monotone. 4 Following Bikhchandani and Mamer 1 and Gul and Stacchetti 7 , we assume that each agent i is initially endowed with wealth W i u i that enables him to buy any commodity bundle A . We denote this economy b y E. 5 3 Vickrey noted its importance for the incentive property of his second-price auction mechanism to hold. However, he did not provide evidence how buyers may misrepresent the mechanism if it is not satis ed. The auction literature thereafter often considers the situation that there is one item for sale. 4 A utility function u is weakly monotone if for all A; B 2 such that A B, uA uB. Free disposal is a su cient condition for this assumption. 5 The NBA labor market may provide a good example for this economy if players only care about money. In the NBA labor market a player may b e o wned by a team or by himself, and a team typically owns many players. In this labor market, a player is a seller but a team may be a seller or a buyer or both. The other example of this economy is the secondary sale market for the spectrum licenses in which rms may trade their licenses after they obtain the A feasible allocation Y in the economy E is a partition Y 1; ; Y n of , where agent i is allocated the commodity bundle Y i. We i n troduce some notation from Gul and Stacchetti 7 below. Let T = f1; 2; ; t g be a set and x 2 R t b e a v ector, 
The Existence of Competitive Equilibrium
An economy can be used to generate a coalitional form game. Typically the set of agents in the coalitional form game is the same as in the economy. In many economic situations the equivalence theorem of the core and the competitive equilibria holds, i.e., the core of the coalitional form game coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payo s. Therefore a su cient condition for the nonempty core provides a useful condition for the existence of competitive equilibrium, and vice versa. But we observe that the equivalence theorem fails in the bilateral exchange economy i n Bikhchandani and Mamer 1 and Gul and Stacchetti 7 and in the exchange economy E in Section 2 when the coalitional form game is generated in the standard manner.
Example 1 Consider the following economy with three agents, i, j and k. Agent i is endowed with three objects, 1, 2 and 3, and has zero utility o ver any bundle of the three objects. Agents j and k have utility functions as follows see Kelso and Crawford 11 : licenses from the auction; see McMillan 14 for an example. u j f1g = 4 ; u j f2g = 4 ; u j f3g = 4 + 1 u j f1; 2g = 7 + ; u j f1; 3g = 7 ; u j f2; 3g = 7 u j f1; 2; 3g = 9 u k f1g = 4 + 2 ; u k f2g = 4 ; u k f3g = 4 u k f1; 2g = 7 ; u k f1; 3g = 7 ; u k f2; 3g = 7 + u k f1; 2; 3g = 9 where 2 0; 1 and 1 ; 2 2 0; 3 . Clearly, these utility functions are weakly monotone.
We n o w de ne the coalitional form game w on fi; j; kg in the standard manner. does not have a competitive equilibrium. Therefore, this example shows that the core equivalence theorem fails for the coalitional form game w. The balancedness condition of the game w is not su cient for the existence of competitive equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
To resolve the problem, we construct from the original exchange economy E a bilateral oneẼ such that N and are the two disjoint sets of agents inẼ such that each agent i in N has the same utility functions as he does in E but with no initial endowments and each agent ! 2 o wns one single indivisible object, namely the object itself, but she has zero utility functions. We use the economyẼ to generate a coalitional form game V and make use of the core of this game to study the existence of competitive equilibrium in the economy E.
De nition A feasible allocation inẼ is a map X : N ! 2 N such that i for all ! 2 , X! 2 N f !g; ii for all ! 2 such that X! 6 2 N, X! = !; iii for all i 2 N, Xi ; iv for all ! 2 and i 2 N, X! = i if and only if ! 2 Xi. Let T ; N denote the set of all feasible allocations inẼ. Given a subset S N , let TS ; S N denote the set of all feasible allocations for the coalition S. Also letD i P denote the demand correspondence in the economyẼ. T h us a pair X;P of a feasible allocation X and a price vector P is a competitive equilibrium if i P 0; ii P ! = 0 for all ! such that X! = !; and iii Xi 2D i P for all i 2 N. Step1. CV = W. This implies that v i P u i A, A ; P , contradicting P is competitive.
Step 2.W 6 = ; i W 6 = ;.
First note that every competitive price vector in the economies E andẼ is nonnegative. This follows from the assumption that agents have w eakly monotone utility functions. Let S b e any commodity bundle. Then for all agents i 2 N, u i S+ i ; P , S ; P u i C+ i ; P , C ; P if and only if u i S, S ; P u i C, C ; P for all C . Let Y;P be a competitive equilibrium in the economy E. Since Y is a partition, Y is an allocation inẼ. Because Y i 2 D i P for all i 2 N, it follows from * that Y i 2D i P for all i 2 N. T h us Y;P is a competitive equilibrium in the economyẼ. Let X;P be a competitive equilibrium in the economyẼ. Then by de nition, we h a ve i P ! j = 0 for all ! j such that X! j = ! j and ii Xi 2D i P for all i 2 N. It follows from * and ii that Xi 2 D i P for all i 2 N. Let Theorem 1 shows that the balancedness of the game V does provide a useful necessary and su cient condition for the existence of competitive equilibrium in the exchange economy E. F rom the construction of the economyẼ, w e know precisely what is a competitive price vector. A competitive price vector in the economy E is nothing but a core payo vector received by the commodities sellers" in the game V .
Next we apply Theorem 1 to study Example 1 to nd out which set of parameters admits a competitive equilibrium and which does not. This example may be helpful to show w h y Theorem 1 is useful. The game V for Example 1 is de ned as follows:
V fj; Cg = u j C for all C V fk;Cg = u k C for all C V fC; j; kg = ii A competitive equilibrium exists in Example 1 if and only if 1 ; 2 2 F .
Claim ii is an application of Claim i and Theorem 1. The sets of parameters in Example 1 that admit a competitive equilibrium consist of the two triangles and the origin in Figure 1 described by the set F. A n y other parameters do not have a competitive equilibrium.
Consider the economy E in Example 1 with 1 = 2 = 1 4 and = 1 2 . Kelso and Crawford 11 showed that the constructed economyẼ has an empty core they showed this by the core conditions. Therefore the economyẼ does not have a competitive equilibrium. Their result together with Step 2 shows that the economy E in Example 1 does not have a competitive equilibrium.
Alternatively, one can use the condition in Claim i to show that when 1 = 2 = 1 4 and = 1 2 , the game V is not balanced. Therefore a competitive equilibrium does not exist with these parameters.
Proof of Claim i. Since the game V is superadditive, Theorem 3 in Shapley 18 shows that the core CV 6 = ; i the game V is balanced for every proper minimal balanced collection. 6 To nd all proper minimal balanced collections, we consider a proper balanced collection C = fC fj;kg ; C fjg ; C fkg g of N such that each element o f C fj;kg , C fjg and C fkg contains fj; kg, fjg and fkg, respectively. Let x; y and z be the balanced weight o f fj; kg of the collection C fj;kg , the balanced weight o f fjg of the collection C fjg and the balanced weight o f fkg of the collection C fkg , respectively. It follows that y = z since x + y = 1 = x + z. Clearly x 0; y 0 and z 0 since C is proper. Thus each C fj;kg , C fjg and C fkg must contain at least one element. Now it follows from Shapley 18 that ff1; 2g; f1; 3g; f2;3gg is the unique minimal balanced collection of f1; 2; 3g: Therefore, a minimal balanced collection C that is also proper must be one of such one-to-one maps : ffj; kg; fjg;fkgg ! ff1; 2g; f1; 3g; f2; 3gg: Thus, we m ust have x = y = z = 1 2 . It follows that V is balanced if and only if 1 2 V f1; 3; j ; k g + 1 2 V f1; 2; j g + 1 2 V f2; 3; k g V N; since for any coalition C such that C 6 = , V fC; j; kg V f1; 3; j ; k g, V fC;jg V f1; 2; j g and V fC;kg V f2; 3; k g.
In Shapley 18 it is shown that the core is nonempty for any superadditive three players f1; 2; 3g coalitional form gamew if and only if 1 2w f1; 3g + 1 2w f1; 2g + 1 2w f2; 3g wf1; 2; 3g:
Our condition above for the economy in Example 1 is analogous to the result in Shapley 18 . In any general exchange economy with N = fj; kg and = f1; 2; 3g, it is su cient and necessary to check six such inequalities see the map above for the existence of competitive equilibrium.
In the close of this section we remark that if agents have m ultiple units of the same good or di erent agents have the same good, then Theorem 1 still holds. This is due to two observations. The rst one is that multiple copies of the same good will have the same price at any competitive equilibrium. Otherwise there exist arbitrage opportunities at equilibrium. The second one is that each copy, as a commodity seller, of the same good will have the same payo in all core outcomes of the game V . This is because all copies of the same good are symmetric in the game V and any core outcome will assign the same payo to these symmetric sellers according to the core conditions. Therefore the conditions that identical goods would have t o h a ve the same price will be satis ed at all competitive equilibria and in all core outcomes. Also see Bikhchandani and Mamer 1 for a detailed discussion.
Misrepresentation
Let U n denote the set of all pro les of weakly monotone utility functions such that a competitive equilibrium exists in the economy Eu for every u 2 U n . Given an exchange economy Eu, a competitive price vector P is the minimum competitive price vector if it satis es P P for every competitive price vector P in the economy. A mechanism '; P is a competitive price mechanism if 'u; P u is a competitive equilibrium for each pro le u 2 U n and it is the minimum competitive price mechanism if Pu is the minimum competitive price vector for each pro le u 2 U n . Similarly one may de ne the maximum competitive price vector and the maximum competitive price mechanism. A mechanism '; P induces a strategic form game and it is individually coalitionally strategy proof on the domain U n if it is always the best for every agent every member in each coalition to reveal his her true utility function u i for every pro le u 2 U n .
In the Vickrey auction model and the assignment problem, the minimum competitive price mechanism is individually strategy proof and it is also coalitionally strategy proof if side payments are prohibited. We show that the nice incentive properties of the minimum competitive price mechanism in these two models do not carry over to the current exchange economy. Indeed examples of exchange economies exist for which no competitive price mechanism is individually coalitionally strategy proof.
Proposition 1 There exists an exchange economy such that no competitive price mechanism is individually coalitionally strategy proof.
Proof. Let Let P be any competitive price vector in the economy Eu. It follows from Y j; Y 0 j 2 D j P that u j f1; 2g , P 1 , P 2 = u j f1g , P 1 . T h us P 2 = u j f1; 2g , u j f1g = 3 1 2 . It also follows from Y 0 j 2 D j P that u j f1g , P 1 u j f1; 3g , P 1 , P 3 . T h us P 3 3. By symmetry, w e h a ve that P 1 3 and P 1 = P 3 . W e claim that P = 3 ; 3 1 2 ; 3 is the minimum competitive price vector. To see this, it is su cient t o s h o w that P = 3 ; 3 1 2 ; 3 is competitive. But this is an easy task to check.
At the minimum competitive price vector P , agents j and k each obtain trading pro ts 1. Since they are buyers not sellers, the minimum competitive price mechanism is the most favorable one to them. Thus the trading pro ts for agents j and k are at most 1 for any competitive price mechanism when they report truthfully.
Given agents i and k reporting their truth, we show that agent j can obtain more than 1 for any competitive price mechanism by misreporting her utility functions as follows: u j f1g = u j f2g = u j f3g = 1 1 2 u j f1; 2g = u j f1; 3g = u j f2; 3g = 3 ;ũ j f1; 2; 3g = 4 :5:
Note thatũ j is monotone. Letũ = u i ;ũ j ; u k . There are two optimal allocations X and X 0 in the economy Eũ de ned by Xj = ;; X 0 j = f1g and Xk = f1; 2; 3g; X 0 k = f2; 3g:
Note that agent j reduces the competition in the demand side by such misrepresentation.
Let Q be any competitive price vector in the economy Eũ. It follows from Xk; X 0 k 2 D k Q that Q 1 = 1 1 2 , and Q 1 Q 2 Q 1 + 1 2 and Q 1 Q 3 Q 1 + 1 2 : Thus agent j obtains true trading pro ts 2 1 2 in the economy Eũ for any competitive price mechanism. But she obtains at most 1 when she reveals her true utility functions for any competitive price mechanism in the economy Eu. This shows that no competitive price mechanism in the economy Eu is individually strategy proof.
We n o w show that no competitive price mechanism in Eu is also coalitionally strategy proof.
Since 1 1 2 ; 2; 2 is competitive, it must be the maximum competitive price vector in the economy Eũ, at which agent k obtains trading pro ts 3 1 2 . Since agent k is a buyer not a seller, he can obtain at least 3 1 better o when agent j misreports her utility functions bỹ u j for any competitive price mechanism in the economy Eũ. Thus each member in the coalition fj; kg can do better for any competitive price mechanism when agent j misreports her utility functions bỹ u j , without side payments. This completes the proof.
